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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White: 
Retaliation Clarified 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.  Title VII 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s antidiscrimination 
provision proscribes employment discrimination based on “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”1 Its antiretaliation provision proscribes 
“discriminat[ion] against . . . employees or applicants for employment” 
because they have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in [a Title VII] investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”2 In 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court stated that 
“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”3 A primary purpose of 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is “[m]aintaining unfettered access to 
statutory remedial mechanisms.”4 It seeks to accomplish this objective 
“by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an 
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of [Title VII’s] 
basic guarantees.”5 In other words, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision 
seeks to “prevent employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that 
dissuade employees from engaging in protected conduct.”6
 
B.  Circuit Split 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the scope of Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision was the subject of considerable disagreement between the 
circuits. They reasoned differently about whether the challenged 
retaliatory action had to be employment or workplace related and about 
how harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to retaliation.7 In 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 2. § 2000e-3(a). 
 3. 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
 4. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
 5. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006). 
 6. Id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 2406. 
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Burlington, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute. 
 
C.  Burlington: The Facts 
 
Sheila White (“White”) was the only woman working in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company’s (“Burlington’s”) Maintenance 
of Way department in its Memphis, Tennessee yard.8 Although White 
was hired as a “track laborer,” a position that involved “removing and 
replacing track components, transporting track material, cutting brush, 
and clearing litter and cargo spillage from the right-of-way,” her primary 
responsibility was operating the company forklift.9
In September 1997, White complained to Burlington officials that 
her immediate supervisor had made inappropriate and insulting remarks 
to her in front of her male colleagues.10 As a result, Burlington 
suspended the supervisor for ten days and ordered him to attend a sexual-
harassment training session.11 On September 26, Burlington’s 
roadmaster, Marvin Brown, told White that he was reassigning her from 
operating the forklift to performing only standard track laborer tasks.12 
He explained that the reassignment was a reflection of co-workers’ 
complaints that, in fairness, a “more senior man” should have the 
“cleaner” and “less arduous” job of operating the forklift.13
On October 10, White filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that the reassignment 
constituted unlawful gender-based discrimination and retaliation for her 
initial complaint about her supervisor’s inappropriate remarks.14 In 
December, White filed another retaliation complaint with the EEOC, 
alleging that Brown had placed her under increased supervision and was 
scrutinizing her activities from day to day.15
A few days after the second EEOC complaint was mailed to Brown, 
White had a disagreement with her immediate supervisor.16 Her 
immediate supervisor told Brown that White had been insubordinate.17 
Consequently, Brown suspended White without pay. White appealed to 
 8. Id. at 2409. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (quoting White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Burlington’s internal grievance procedures.18 This led Burlington to 
decide that White had not been insubordinate.19 Accordingly, Burlington 
reinstated White to her position and paid her for the thirty-seven days she 
was suspended.20 White filed a third retaliation claim with the EEOC 
based on the suspension.21
After filing the three EEOC claims, White filed a Title VII action 
against Burlington in federal court.22 She claimed that Burlington 
retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII, first when it reassigned 
her, and again, when it suspended her.23 A jury found against Burlington 
on both retaliation claims and awarded White $43,500 in compensatory 
damages.24 After the trial, Burlington filed a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, which the district court denied.25 The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s judgment 
in favor of White on both retaliation claims.26 Although all of the 
members of the en banc court agreed to affirm the district court’s 
judgment, they failed to agree on the retaliation standard to apply.27
Before Burlington, the circuits disagreed as to the standards 
applicable in Title VII cases.28  The circuits answered two fundamental 
questions in different ways: (1) whether the challenged employer action 
had to be employment or workplace related, and (2) how harmful the 
retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable retaliation.29 The 
disagreement ended in Burlington. 
On the question of whether the challenged employer action had to be 
employment or workplace related, the Supreme Court answered that Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision extends beyond retaliatory acts and harms 
that are related to the workplace or employment.30 And on the question 
of how harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable 
retaliation, the Court answered that a plaintiff must show that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially 
adverse.31 The Court explained that this means the action “well might 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2410. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2414. 
 31. Id. at 2415. 
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have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.”32 This paper asserts that although Burlington’s 
helpfulness is somewhat undermined by the questions it left unanswered 
and the potential problems that may follow, the answers it did provide 
are significant. They offer desperately needed relief to retaliation law, 
improving it in a manner consistent with the purpose and design of Title 
VII. Section II will give a detailed overview of the circuit split prior to 
Burlington. Section III will discuss Burlington’s resolution to that split. 
Section IV will discuss the importance of Burlington’s answers and 
introduce the limits to their helpfulness. Finally, Section V will offer a 
brief conclusion. 
 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT PRIOR TO BURLINGTON 
 
A.  The “Adverse Employment Action” Standard 
 
Prior to Burlington, some circuits required that the retaliatory action 
be somehow related to employment or the workplace.33 These circuits 
followed the “adverse employment action” standard. For example, the 
Sixth Circuit majority in White v. Burlington Northern & Railway Co. 
stated that a plaintiff must prove the existence of an “adverse 
employment action” to support a Title VII claim.34 The Sixth Circuit 
defined “adverse employment action” as a “materially adverse change in 
the terms and conditions” of employment.35 In addition, the Second 
Circuit in Torres v. Pisano stated that the existence of an “adverse 
employment action” is essential to a plaintiff’s Title VII claim.36 Then 
the court explained that to show that the plaintiff “suffered an adverse 
employment action,” she had to show that she “suffered ‘a materially 
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.’”37  
Similarly, in Von Gunten v. Maryland, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
challenged retaliatory action had to result in an adverse effect on the 
“terms, conditions, or benefits” of employment.38 Taking the same 
approach, in Robinson v. Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit held that the 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2410. 
 34. 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 35. Id. (citing Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 36. 116 F.3d 625, 639 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Co., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
 37. Id. at 640 (quoting McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F.Supp. 
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 38. 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 
F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
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challenged retaliatory conduct violates Title VII only if it alters the 
employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment,” deprives the employee of “employment opportunities,” or 
adversely affects the employee’s status as an employee.39 Thus, these 
circuits required that the challenged retaliatory action be somehow 
related to employment or the workplace. 
 
B.  The “Ultimate Employment Decision” Standard 
 
Other circuits took an even more restrictive approach. The Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits, for example, used the “ultimate employment decision” 
standard. In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Fifth Circuit stated that 
“Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions.”40 It 
defined “ultimate employment decisions” as acts “such as hiring, 
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating.”41 The Eighth 
Circuit took the same approach in Manning v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co.42 In rejecting a retaliation claim brought by several 
Metropolitan Life employees against the company, the court explained 
that the employees “did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
any adverse employment action that would amount to the type of 
ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under Title 
VII.”43 The court suggested that evidence of a “tangible change in duties 
or working conditions that constituted a material employment 
disadvantage” may have satisfied the standard.44 Thus, as compared to 
the “adverse employment action” standard, the “ultimate employment 
decision” standard represented a more restrictive approach, prohibiting 
retaliation only if it resulted in an ultimate employment decision.45
 
 
 39. 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 40. 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 
1995)). 
 41. Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782). 
 42. 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir 1997).
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ ultimate employment 
decision standard: “‘ultimate employment decision’ is not the standard in this circuit. . . . [W]e have 
expressly rejected distinctions, like those drawn by the Mattern court, between § 2000e-2 and § 
2000e-3, reasoning that ‘conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be preferred.’ 
Moreover, in Ross, we also implicitly rejected the Mattern court view that nothing less than an 
‘ultimate employment decision’ can constitute adverse employment action under § 2000e-3.” Von 
Gunten v. Maryland., 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 
759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
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C.  The “Threshold Level of Substantiality” Standard46
 
The Eleventh Circuit implicitly rejected the “ultimate employment 
decision” standard. In Bass v. Board of Commissioners, the court first 
stated that a plaintiff must show an “adverse employment action” as part 
of their prima facie case of retaliation.47 The court then explained that 
“[a]n adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision, 
such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that alters the 
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or 
adversely affects his or her status as an employee.”48 However, the court 
went on to say that conduct that did not amount to an ultimate 
employment decision had to meet a “threshold level of substantiality” to 
fall within the purview of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.49 
Since the court explicitly recognized the possibility that an actionable 
retaliation claim might fall short of alleging an ultimate employment 
decision, it implicitly rejected the ultimate employment decision 
standard. The court further explained that although “‘not everything that 
makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,’ conduct 
that alters an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment does constitute an adverse action under Title VII.”50 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit applied a standard more akin to the “adverse 










 46. The Eleventh Circuit never labeled its retaliation standard as the “threshold level of 
substantiality” standard. Nor has the phrase been used in other circuits to refer to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s standard of retaliation. The phrase is used here simply to draw a line between the Eleventh 
Circuit’s standard and the more general “adverse employment action” standard. 
 47. 256 F.3d 1095, 1117 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 
571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
 48. Id. at 1118 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gupta, 212 F.3d 571, 587). 
 49. Id. (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 50. Bass, 256 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Smart v. Ball Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) 
and citing Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) and Robinson 
v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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D.  Conformity Among the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eight, and 
Eleventh Circuits 
 
Although these circuits came to different conclusions on how 
harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable 
retaliation all of them generally agreed that the action and any 
consequent harms had to be related to the workplace or employment.51 
Other circuits took a more expansive approach. 
 
E.  The “Material to a Reasonable Employee” Standard 
 
The Seventh, Ninth, and the District of Columbia Circuits did not 
insist upon a close relationship between the retaliatory action and the 
workplace or employment.52 The Seventh Circuit and the District of 
Columbia Circuit simply required that the plaintiff show that the 
“employer’s challenged action would have been material to a reasonable 
employee.”53 In Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, and in 
Rochon v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia 
Circuit explained that an employer’s action is material to a reasonable 
employee if the challenged action would “have dissuaded a reasonable 
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”54 In 
Rochon v. Gonzales, the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the 
Seventh Circuit that “in order to support a claim of retaliation a plaintiff 
must demonstrate the ‘employer’s challenged action would have been 
 51. This conclusion follows from the language used to articulate their respective retaliation 
standards. Note that this language used to articulate their respective retaliation standards expressly 
limited Title VII’s scope to employment-related or workplace-related actions and consequent harms. 
For example, the Second and Sixth Circuits defined “adverse employment action” as action that 
resulted in a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. See White v. 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2004). The Third and Fourth Circuits 
defined “adverse employment action” as action that resulted in an adverse effect on the terms, 
conditions, or benefits of employment. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 
2001); Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300.  And the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits defined “adverse 
employment action” as action that resulted in an ultimate employment decision. See Bass, 256 F.3d 
at 1118 (quoting Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781(5th Cir. 1995)); Manning v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); see also discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
 52. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that retaliation 
includes “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive.”) (quoting EEOC.E.O.C. 
Compliance Manual § 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)); Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 
606 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is broad enough to proscribe 
retaliatory actions “that are not ostensibly employment related”). 
 53. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Washington v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)); Washington, 420 F.3d at 662. 
 54. Washington, 420 F.3d at 662; Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d 
at 662). 
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material to a reasonable employee.’”55 Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the 
District of Columbia Circuit defined “material to a reasonable employee” 
as action that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”56
The Ninth Circuit also took a protective approach. Following EEOC 
guidance, the Ninth Circuit simply required that the plaintiff establish 
“adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably 
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected 
activity.”57
 
F.  Conformity Among the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia 
Circuits 
 
These circuits generally agreed that the retaliatory action had to be 
materially adverse to a reasonable employee and did not have to be 
employment or workplace related in order to state a retaliation claim. 
In sum, prior to Burlington the circuits disagreed on whether the 
challenged employer action had to be employment or workplace related 
and how harmful the action had to be to amount to retaliation. Some 
required that the challenged employer action be employment or 
workplace related (i.e., the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Eleventh). Some did not (i.e., the Seventh, Ninth, and District of 
Columbia). Of those that required the challenged employer action to be 
employment or workplace related, some required the action to result in 
an “ultimate employment decision” (i.e., the Fifth and Eighth), and some 
did not (i.e., the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh). 
 
III.  BURLINGTON’S RESOLUTION 
 
In Burlington, the Supreme Court resolved the disagreement. On the 
question of whether the challenged employer action had to be 
employment or workplace related, the Court held that the “scope of the 
antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or 
employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”58 In so holding, the Court 
expressly rejected the “ultimate employment decision[]” standard and 
“the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated [Title 
VII’s] antiretaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited 
 55. 438 F.3d at 1219. 
 56. Id. (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662). 
 57. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, 
“Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)). 
 58. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). 
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by the antidiscrimination  provision” (i.e., the standards that required a 
relationship between the challenged act and the workplace or 
employment, specifically the standards in the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).59 On the question of how 
harmful the retaliatory action had to be to amount to actionable 
retaliation, the Court held that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable 
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse.”60 
The Court explained that a plaintiff must show that the challenged action 
“well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.’”61
 
A.  The Scope of Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision Extends Beyond 
Workplace-Related or Employment-Related Retaliatory Acts and Harm 
 
The Court relied on several bases to conclude that the scope of Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision can reach retaliatory acts that are not 
related to employment or the workplace. First, the Court examined the 
language of Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation 
provisions.62 The Court determined that the antidiscrimination provision 
contains words limiting its scope to actions that affect employment or 
change the conditions of the workplace.63 In contrast, the antiretaliation 
provision contains no such limiting words.64 The Court concluded that 
Congress likely “intended the different words to make a legal 
difference.”65 The Court based its conclusion in part on the presumption 
that where particular language is used in one section of a statute but 
omitted in another section of the same Act, the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion is intentional.66
Second, the Court compared the purpose of Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination provision to the purpose of its antiretaliation provision 
and determined that the two provisions have different purposes.67 The 
Court explained that the purpose of the antidiscrimination provision is to 
prevent harm to individuals based on their status, which Congress could 
accomplish without prohibiting anything other than employment-related 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2415. 
 61. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 62. Id. at 2411–12 (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) and § 2000e-2(a)(2)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2412. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 67. Id. at 2412. 
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discrimination.68 The purpose of the antiretaliation provision, on the 
other hand, is to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, 
which Congress could not accomplish by prohibiting only employer 
actions and harm that relate to employment or the workplace.69 If 
Congress prohibited only employer actions and harm that are 
employment related or workplace related, an employer could retaliate 
against an employee by causing the employee harm outside the 
workplace or taking acts not directly related to employment.70 
Accordingly, if the antiretaliation provision were limited to employment-
related actions, it would fail to deter the many forms that retaliation can 
take.71 Thus, the Court determined that the antiretaliation provision is not 
limited to employment-related or workplace-related discriminatory 
actions.72
Third, the Court turned to precedent and determined that no prior 
Supreme Court case required a contrary result.73 The Court conceded that 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth spoke of “a Title VII requirement 
that violations involve . . . ‘hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.’”74 However, the Court 
explained that Ellerth spoke of the requirement only to “‘identify a class 
of [hostile work environment] cases’ in which an employer should be 
held vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the acts of 
supervisors.”75 The Court emphasized that Ellerth did not address the 
scope of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision and did not even bring 
up Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.76 Thus, the Court maintained that 
the decision in Ellerth did not compel a contrary result in Burlington. 
Fourth, the Court examined the EEOC’s interpretations of the 
antiretaliation provision.77 Although the Court admitted that the EEOC’s 
1991 and 1988 Compliance Manuals expressly limited the antiretaliation 
provision’s scope to adverse employment-related action, it emphasized 
that in those same manuals the EEOC used language suggesting a 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2412–13. 
 73. Id. at 2413. 
 74. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). 
 75. Id. (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2413–14 (finding no “significant support for [Ellerth’s] view in the EEOC’s 
interpretations of the provision”). 
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broader interpretation.78 The Court explained that “both before and after 
publication of the 1991 and 1988 manuals, the EEOC similarly expressed 
a broad interpretation of the antiretaliation provision.”79 It also noted that 
in the 1998 Manual, the EEOC addressed the question of whether the 
antiretaliation provision of Title VII is limited to employment-related 
activity and concluded that it is not.80 Thus, the Court determined that the 
EEOC’s interpretations of the antiretaliation provision did not support 
the view that the challenged retaliatory act must be employment related 
to support a Title VII retaliation claim.81
After finding support for its conclusion on those four bases, the 
Court stated its defense to the argument that it would be “anomalous” to 
interpret Title VII “to provide broader protection for victims of 
retaliation than for those whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect, 
namely, victims of . . . discrimination.”82 It noted that “Congress has 
provided similar kinds of protection” in other statutes “without any 
judicial suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct 
prohibited by the primary substantive provisions.”83 The Court went on 
to explain that “differences in the purpose of the antiretaliation and 
antidiscrimination provisions remove any perceived ‘anomaly,’ for 
they. . . [] justify [the] difference of interpretation.”84 It reemphasized 
that “interpreting the antiretaliation  provision to provide broad 
protection from retaliation” furthers the primary objective of the 
statute—securing a workplace where individuals are not discriminated 
against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status—
because it helps assure the “cooperation of employees [in] . . . fil[ing] 
complaints and act[ing] as witnesses.”85
Given that defense, and support from the language, purpose, 
precedent, and EEOC interpretations of Title VII, the Court concluded 
that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is not limited to employment-





 78. Id. at 2413. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2413–14. 
 81. Id. at 2413. 
 82. Id. at 2414. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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B.  To Violate Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision, the Plaintiff Must 
Show that a Reasonable Employee Would Have Found the Challenged 
Action Materially Adverse 
 
After deciding the first issue, whether the challenged retaliatory 
action had to be employment related, the Court turned to the issue of how 
harmful the action had to be to constitute retaliation. The Court 
concluded that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would 
have found the challenged retaliatory action materially adverse,” which 
means that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”87 In speaking of 
“material” adverseness, the Court explained that it is meant to distinguish 
“significant from trivial harms.”88 In speaking of reactions of a 
“reasonable” employee, the Court noted, it intended to set forth an 
“objective standard.”89 The Court phrased the standard in broad terms, it 
explained, “because the significance of any given act of retaliation will 
often depend on the particular circumstances.”90 By way of example, the 
Court noted that “a schedule change in an employee’s work schedule 
may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously 
to a young mother with small children.”91 Thus, the Court concluded, “a 
legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific prohibited 
acts is preferable . . . .”92
 
C.  Application of the New Standard 
 
In applying the new standard to the facts of the case at bar, the Court 
concluded that based on the record, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
both challenged acts of retaliation—the reassignment of responsibilities 
and the thirty-seven day suspension without pay—would have been 
materially adverse to a reasonable employee.93 Accordingly, the Court 





 87. Id. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2416. 
 93. Id. at 2417. 
 94. Id. 
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IV.  LIMITS TO BURLINGTON’S HELPFULNESS 
 
Burlington provided answers to the two fundamental questions that 
split the circuits—(1) whether the challenged employer action had to be 
employment or workplace related, and (2) how harmful the retaliatory 
action had to be to amount to actionable retaliation. However, Burlington 
left some questions unanswered. For example, it did not explicitly state a 
legal basis for the retaliation standard it adopted. Nor did it explain why 
the standard only proscribes those employer actions that well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination. It did not explain what subjective factors are appropriate 
for consideration under the standard. Nor did it explain how the 
standard’s causation element can be satisfied. 
Although Burlington’s helpfulness is somewhat undermined by the 
questions it left unanswered and the potential problems that may follow, 
the answers it did provide are significant. To illustrate the point, 
Subsection A will discuss a case decided by the Fifth Circuit prior to 
Burlington, using the ultimate employment decision standard. It will 
assert that the ultimate employment decision standard was flawed by 
positing the likely result of the case if it had been before any other circuit 
and noting the disparity between the likely results in those circuits and 
the actual result in the Fifth. Finally, it will show how Burlington 
addressed the flaws in the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment decision 
standard. Subsection B will offer a brief overview of some of the 
questions Burlington left unanswered and explain why they may not be 
as problematic as they seem. 
 
A.  Answers 
 
Burlington is helpful in the sense that it resolved the disagreement 
among the circuits about whether a challenged retaliatory action had to 
be employment or workplace related and about how harmful that action 
had to be to amount to retaliation. Prior to Burlington, retaliation was a 
very confused area of law. Different circuits applied different standards. 
Some insisted that the challenged employer action result in an ultimate 
employment decision and others recognized less extreme employer 
actions. By holding that the challenged employer action does not have to 
be related to the workplace or employment and by setting forth a test for 
determining if the action is harmful enough to amount to retaliation, 
Burlington created uniformity and provided at least some clarity to 
retaliation law. Theoretically, then, cases with similar facts will now 
have similar results, no matter the circuit. Prior to Burlington, cases with 
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similar facts could easily have different results, depending entirely on the 
circuit. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co. is a perfect case in point. 
 
1.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
 
The Fifth Circuit decided Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co. nine years 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington.95 Applying the 
ultimate decision standard, the Fifth Circuit rejected a retaliation claim 
based on the type of discriminatory changes in the plaintiff’s terms, 
conditions, and benefits of employment that most other courts would 
have easily recognized as sufficient to amount to retaliation under Title 
VII.96 Jean Mattern was registered in Eastman’s mechanic’s 
apprenticeship program, which consisted of hands-on training and 
classroom instruction.97 The program incorporated “Major Skills Tests” 
as well as fourteen “review cycles.”98 Successful completion of the 
review cycles led to regular salary increases.99 On the other hand, 
apprentices who performed poorly on three review cycles or failed three 
skills tests could be dismissed from the program.100
In March, 1993, Mattern filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC, 
claiming that two senior mechanics had sexually harassed her and that 
her supervisors were aware of it.101 After learning of the charge, Eastman 
transferred Mattern to another crew where she worked under a different 
immediate supervisor but the same departmental supervisors.102 She 
continued to experience “difficulties.”103 She eventually resigned and 
filed an action against Eastman, alleging, among other things, that it “had 
a policy and practice of approving and condoning a hostile work 
environment,” and that it “had retaliated, and allowed its employees to 
retaliate, against her for reporting the harassment to the EEOC and for 
filing [the] action.”104 A jury found that, although Eastman employees 
had harassed Mattern, Eastman had taken timely corrective action in 
response.105 Consequently, Mattern lost her hostile work environment 
 95. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 96. Id. at 710; see Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 97. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 703. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 704. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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sexual harassment claim.106 However, the jury found in Mattern’s favor 
with respect to her retaliation claim and awarded damages.107
Eastman appealed the jury’s decision to the Fifth Circuit.108 The Fifth 
Circuit majority held that the retaliation evidence was insufficient and 
reversed the jury’s verdict.109 The court divided Mattern’s retaliation 
evidence into five parts. First, on a day Mattern had taken vacation leave 
after complaining of a work-related illness, Eastman sent two 
supervisors, one of whom was named in the EEOC charge, to her home 
to tell her to return to Eastman Medical if her illness was work-related.110 
In similar situations, supervisors were rarely, if ever, sent to an 
employee’s home.111 Second, Mattern was disciplined for leaving her 
work station to report the harassment to Eastman’s Human Resources 
Department.112 Third, in the aftermath of Mattern’s EEOC charge, her 
coworkers repeatedly harassed her.113 Mattern testified that one of her 
supervisors threatened to fire her.114 She also testified that her coworkers 
broke into her locker, stole some of her tools, and told her “accidents 
happen.”115 Fourth, the harassment made Mattern physically sick.116 
Fifth, after Mattern’s EEOC charge, Mattern’s work received poor 
reviews, resulting in a missed pay increase and a “final warning” of 
dismissal from the apprenticeship program.117 Many of the negative 
reviews, which were coming from supervisors who had praised Mattern’s 
work in the past, resulted from her “apparent” inability to rebuild and 
realign pumps.118 For instance, prior to her resignation, Mattern was 
assigned to rebuild a pump.119 Although the mechanic who worked on 
the pump with her testified that Mattern rebuilt it correctly, another 
coworker, whom Mattern had named in her EEOC charge, told Mattern’s 
supervisor that the pump was not rebuilt correctly.120 As a result, Mattern 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 709–10. 
 110. Id. at 705. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 706 (explaining that Mattern’s doctor thought her illness was a result of the 
hostility at Eastman). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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failed the assignment.121 In another instance, Mattern’s supervisor told 
her to realign a pump while he watched.122 The pump was resting on a 
wooden pallet, which made it more difficult to realign.123 Mattern was 
unable to complete the assignment.124 She testified that the pump was 
purposefully placed on the wooden pallet, as opposed to a more solid 
base, to derail her.125
Despite all of this evidence offered in support of Mattern’s 
retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit majority held it insufficient. The court 
emphasized that “Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment 
decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably 
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”126 The 
court explained that none of the events Mattern complained of amounted 
to an ultimate employment decision, “such as hiring, granting leave, 
discharging, promoting, and compensating.”127 The visit to her home, the 
reprimand for being away from her work station, the missed pay 
increase, and the placement on “final warning” all lacked 
consequence.128 The same analysis applied to Mattern’s other problems. 
Failing two Major Skills Tests and having reprimands documented in her 
file may have increased her chances of being discharged, but they did not 
result in her being discharged or in any other ultimate employment 
decision.129 Therefore, all of Mattern’s retaliation evidence was deemed 
insufficient to amount to retaliation.130
 
2.  The Fifth Circuit standard’s flaws 
 
The Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment decision standard was 
flawed in at least two respects. First, it interpreted Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision to proscribe only ultimate employment decisions 
and not the “vague” harms contemplated by its antidiscrimination 
provision.131 Accordingly, under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an 
 121. See id. (explaining that Mattern’s supervisor documented the pump failure). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782). 
 128. Id. at 708. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 709–10 (explaining that the antiretaliation provision speaks only of 
“discrimination,” and therefore does not contemplate the vague harms—such as the deprivation of 
employment opportunities or an adverse affect on an employee’s status—that Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination provision does). 
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employer could effectively retaliate against an employee, even if the 
retaliatory actions deprived the employee of opportunities or adversely 
affected their status, so long as the actions did not result in an ultimate 
employment decision.132 Second, the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate employment 
decision standard effectively eliminated consideration of hostile work 
environment harassment as a separate basis for retaliation. Thus, under 
the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an employer could successfully retaliate 
against an employee for filing a hostile work environment harassment 
claim (or any other discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work 
environment.133 Although it is unclear whether the Fifth Circuit intended 
these results, it is clear that those results were inconsistent with the 
purpose and design of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. 
The Fifth Circuit standard’s flaws can be illustrated by positing how 
the Mattern decision might have had a different result if it had been 
decided by another circuit. Arguably, had the same retaliation evidence 
been presented to any other circuit, Mattern’s favorable jury verdict 
would have been upheld. In Ross, decided by the Fourth Circuit, a 
Communications Satellite Corporation (“COMSAT”) employee brought 
action against the company, alleging that it retaliated against him for 
filing a sex discrimination claim with the EEOC.134 The employee 
contended that, after he filed the EEOC claim, he experienced 
harassment by COMSAT superiors.135 He also alleged that COMSAT 
essentially demoted him, “denied [him] a performance review and annual 
pay and benefit increases,” and misrepresented his employment record to 
other employers.136 In addition, the employee alleged that his 
performance evaluations fell after the filing of the EEOC claim, even 
though he had received generally positive evaluations before it.137 
Because the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court had 
improperly relied on the preclusive effect of a state administrative 
decision in granting summary judgment to the employer, it reversed and 
remanded the employee’s retaliation claim “for reconsideration of the 
propriety of summary judgment” and “for trial,” if necessary.138 In doing 
 132. See id. 
 133. Note that although, under the Fifth Circuit’s standard, an employer could theoretically 
retaliate against an employee by creating a hostile work environment, the creation of a hostile work 
environment could subject the employer to liability for discrimination. Of course, the employer 
could avoid an adverse finding on a subsequent hostile work environment discrimination claim by 
taking remedial action after retaliating. 
 134. Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 356–57 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 135. Id. at 357. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 363. 
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so, the court recognized that the alleged acts, if proved, could constitute 
unlawful retaliation under Title VII.139
The retaliatory acts alleged in Ross were similar to those alleged in 
Mattern. Both employees alleged that following their respective EEOC 
charges, their work was evaluated more negatively, their coworkers 
harassed them, and they were denied a pay increase. Given that the 
Fourth Circuit in Ross recognized that the alleged retaliatory acts, if 
proved, could constitute retaliation, and that the alleged acts were similar 
to those complained of in Mattern, if the Fourth Circuit had decided 
Mattern, it likely would have found retaliation. This follows not only 
from a comparison between the retaliatory acts in the two cases, but also 
from the Fourth Circuit’s criticism of the Fifth Circuit’s retaliation 
standard. 
In Von Gunten, the Fourth Circuit noted that Ross implicitly rejected 
the Mattern court’s view that only an ultimate employment decision can 
amount to retaliation under Title VII.140 The court rejected the Mattern 
court’s interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision (proscribing 
only ultimate employment decisions and excluding the vague harms 
contemplated by the antidiscrimination provision), stating that 
conformity between the two provisions was to be preferred.141 In other 
words, the Fourth Circuit suggested that Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision proscribes the same conduct proscribed by its 
antidiscrimination provision, not just conduct that results in an ultimate 
employment decision. Considering this criticism, the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Ross, and the retaliatory acts in Ross compared to those in 
Mattern, the Mattern decision probably would have been different if the 
case had been before the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit recognized 
that the alleged acts in Ross, if proved, could constitute retaliation. The 
alleged acts in Ross were similar to those in Mattern. In addition, the 
Fourth Circuit implicitly rejected the ultimate employment decision 
standard applied by the Fifth Circuit in Mattern, suggesting that 
retaliatory acts do not have to result in an ultimate employment decision 
to constitute retaliation. Arguably, then, if the Fourth Circuit had decided 
Mattern, it would have found retaliation. 
Had Mattern been decided by other circuits, again, the result 
probably would have been different. This follows not only from the fact 
 139. Id.; see Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001). Note that if the 
Fourth Circuit had determined that the alleged acts, if proved, could not constitute retaliation, 
remand would have been unnecessary. 
 140. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865 (citing Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 
366 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 141. Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 363 (stating that conformity between the antidiscrimination 
and antiretaliation provisions of Title VII is to be preferred)). 
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that other circuits’ standards would not have required Mattern to show 
that she suffered an ultimate employment decision, but also from their 
recognition of hostile work environment as a separate type of retaliation. 
In finding against Mattern on her retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that the jury found against her on her sexual harassment and constructive 
discharge claims.142 The court then explained that those two adverse 
findings limited the possibility of finding retaliation.143 Although the 
court did not explicitly dismiss consideration of Mattern’s hostile work 
environment claim as not qualifying as retaliation, it implicitly did so by 
limiting the bases for finding retaliation to the jury’s findings in her 
favor. In other words, by reviewing Mattern’s retaliation claim in the 
context of the jury’s adverse findings on her sexual harassment claim,144 
which was based on the creation of a hostile work environment, the Fifth 
Circuit effectively precluded consideration of the alleged creation of a 
hostile work environment as a separate type of retaliation. Essentially, 
the Fifth Circuit majority relied on the outcome of the substantive 
discrimination claim to decide the retaliation issue, considering the two 
claims (discrimination and retaliation) as not only related, but 
inextricably tied. 
The dissent criticized this approach, arguing that, contrary to the 
majority’s interpretation, “§ 704(a) affords an employee an independent 
hostile work environment retaliatory discrimination cause of action upon 
which she may recover in a proper case regardless of the outcome of her 
§ 703 sex discrimination and constructive discharge claims.”145 In other 
words, the dissent viewed Mattern’s discrimination and retaliation claims 
as separate and distinct. From that perspective, the dissent determined 
that the jury’s verdict in favor of Mattern on her retaliation claim was not 
clearly erroneous and should have been affirmed.146
Concerning Mattern’s sexual harassment claim, the jury had been 
instructed that Title VII proscribes “unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, [and] other verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature where the conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with the individual’s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.”147 The 
jury was further instructed that for Eastman to be liable to Mattern for 
 142. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (stating that Mattern’s retaliation claim must be viewed in the context of the jury’s 
adverse findings on her sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims). 
 145. Id. at 710 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Note that section 704 is Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision and section 703 is its antidiscrimination provision. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 706. 
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the actions of its employees, Mattern had to prove: “that she was 
subjected to unwelcome harassment in the form of sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature; . . . that the harassment was based on her sex; . . . that the 
harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment; 
and . . . [that] Eastman either knew or should have known that [Mattern] 
was being sexually harassed and failed to take prompt reasonable 
measures to stop the harassment.”148
Because the jury found that Eastman had acted promptly in taking 
remedial action, and therefore Mattern failed to make one of the 
necessary findings required for Eastman to be held liable for sexual 
harassment for the acts of its employees against her, the jury found 
against Mattern on her hostile work environment sexual harassment 
claim. The majority assumed, without discussion, that the jury’s adverse 
decision on the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim was 
simultaneously an adverse decision on whether Eastman created a hostile 
work environment.149 In other words, the majority assumed that because 
the jury found against Mattern on her hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claim, Eastman did not create an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment. 
Given that Title VII proscribes sexual harassment, that the creation 
of a hostile work environment is a type of sexual harassment, and that the 
jury found against Mattern on her sexual harassment claim, the 
majority’s assumption makes sense. The premise was that if the jury had 
found the creation of a hostile working environment it would have had to 
find unlawful sexual harassment. If the premise were sound, it would 
follow that if the jury had found any other type of sexual harassment, for 
instance, unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, it 
also would have had to find sexual harassment. However, that is not 
necessarily true. A finding of unwelcome sexual advances or requests for 
sexual favors, or other sexual conduct having the purpose or effect of 
creating a hostile work environment was only the first step in the 
analysis. Before the jury could find that any of those types of sexual 
harassment amounted to unlawful sexual harassment, it had to find, in 
addition, that the harassment was based on sex, that it affected a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, and that Eastman knew, or had 
reason to know, about it and failed to take prompt action to stop it. Thus, 
the majority’s premise was flawed. The jury could have found that 
Mattern suffered unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 704. 
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or other sexual conduct that had the purpose or effect of creating a 
hostile work environment and simultaneously found no sexual 
harassment. 
In sum, an adverse finding on a hostile work environment sexual 
harassment claim does not necessarily preclude a favorable finding on 
the underlying question of whether there was a hostile work 
environment. In Mattern, the jury found against Mattern on her sexual 
harassment claim based on its finding that Eastman took prompt action to 
stop the harassment, not based on a finding that there was no harassment, 
which may have created a hostile work environment. To the contrary, the 
jury found that there was harassment.150 However, based on the 
instructions, the jury could not find Eastman liable for sexual harassment 
for the acts of its employees if it found that Eastman took prompt action 
to stop the harassment. Because the jury found that Eastman did take 
prompt action to stop the harassment, it had to find against Mattern on 
her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.151 In other words, 
Mattern’s hostile work environment sexual harassment claim could not 
provide a basis for unlawful discrimination. The majority assumed, 
without articulating any basis for the assumption, that Mattern’s hostile 
work environment sexual harassment claim could not provide a basis for 
unlawful retaliation either. However, its assumption was inconsistent 
with its interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation and antidiscrimination 
provisions. 
The Mattern majority relied on the language of Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination provision compared to the antiretaliation provision to 
support its ultimate employment decision standard.152 The majority 
specifically noted that the first subpart of Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
provision states that it is unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual . . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment.”153 The majority explained that “[t]his type of 
employer action contrasts sharply with the . . . vague proscription, found 
in the next subpart.”154 The next subpart states that it is unlawful for an 
employer to limit, segregate, or classify their employees or applicants for 
employment in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive them of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their status as an 
employee.155 The majority noted that the second subpart reaches much 
 150. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
 152. 104 F.3d at 708–709. 
 153. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
 154. Id. at 709. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000). 
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farther than the first, extending to employer acts that simply “tend” to 
affect employees.156 The majority then turned to the antiretaliation 
provision and noted that it “speaks only of discrimination” and does not 
mention the vague harms contemplated by the second subsection of the 
antidiscrimination provision.157 Accordingly the majority held that the 
antiretaliation “provision can only be read to exclude such vague harms, 
and to include only ultimate employment decisions.”158
By describing as vague only those harms listed in the 
antidiscrimination provision’s second-subpart, and holding that the 
antiretaliation provision does not extend to such vague harms, the 
majority implicitly recognized that the antiretaliation provision does 
extend to non-vague harms, like those described in the antidiscrimination 
provision’s first subpart. Arguably, the creation of a hostile work 
environment is the type of harm more akin to that described by the 
antidiscrimination provision’s first subpart—discrimination with respect 
to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—than 
to the type of vague harm contemplated by the provision’s second 
subpart. Indeed, the creation of a hostile work environment does more 
than merely “tend” to affect an employee. Therefore, it follows that 
discrimination in the form of the creation of a hostile work environment 
is a “non-vague” harm that is covered by Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision, and the Mattern majority’s refusal to consider Mattern’s 
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim as a separate basis for 
retaliation was inappropriate even by its own standards. To be sure, the 
Mattern dissent spoke of the majority’s misinterpretation of Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision and determined that Mattern’s hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claim should have been considered as an 
independent cause of action for retaliation and, furthermore, could have 
provided a basis for finding in Mattern’s favor on her retaliation claim.159
The majority of other circuits probably would have agreed. Prior to 
Burlington, what separated the majority of other circuits from the Fifth 
Circuit (and the Eighth, for that matter) was the Fifth Circuit’s insistence 
that the challenged retaliatory action result in an ultimate employment 
decision. Thus, in Mattern, the Fifth Circuit would not recognize 
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim as an appropriate basis for 
asserting unlawful retaliation, in part, because it simply did not recognize 
harassment as constituting an ultimate employment decision. Therefore, 
a retaliation claim could never be predicated on a harassment claim, 
 156. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2000)). 
 157. Id. (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)).
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 710 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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regardless of the type of harassment (unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, creation of a hostile work environment, etc.) 
because such a claim, without more, would always fall short of the 
ultimate employment decision standard. 
The majority’s logic led to perverse results. Under the Fifth Circuit’s 
standard, an employer could effectively retaliate against an employee 
who filed a hostile work environment harassment claim (or any other 
discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work environment. This was 
clearly inconsistent with Title VII’s design to encourage the creation of 
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.160 
Furthermore, it was inconsistent with Title VII’s purpose to prevent 
employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade 
employees from engaging in protected conduct.161
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, other circuits—those that applied less 
restrictive standards of retaliation—certainly would have recognized 
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim as an independent cause of 
action for retaliation, and possibly would have found retaliation on that 
basis, if not on another. In Jensen v. Potter, for example, the Third 
Circuit cited to its decision in Robinson to hold that a retaliation claim 
predicated upon a hostile work environment claim is actionable under 
Title VII.162 The court explained that Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
provision proscribes “a quantum of discrimination coterminous with that 
prohibited by [its antiretaliation provision].”163 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that since Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision applied to 
hostile work environment claims, so did its antiretaliation provision.164 
Other circuits, specifically the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have also 
recognized retaliation claims, predicated on hostile work environment 
claims, as cognizable under Title VII.165 Arguably, then, these circuits 
(the First, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) would have considered 
Mattern’s hostile work environment claim in evaluating her retaliation 
claim, and may have used it as a separate basis for affirming the jury’s 
verdict. Of course, these circuits may have affirmed the jury’s verdict 
simply by finding that the challenged retaliatory acts met their respective 
standards of retaliation on a basis apart from hostile work environment 
sexual harassment.166
 160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 162. 435 F.3d 444, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 163. Id. at 448 (citing Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300–01 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 164. Id. at 449. 
 165. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95 (1st Cir. 2005); Ray v. Henderson, 
217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 166. This is especially true for the Ninth Circuit, whose standard is especially broad, requiring 
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Even the Eighth Circuit, notwithstanding its restrictive position prior 
to Burlington, would probably have reached a different conclusion than 
the Fifth Circuit if it had decided Mattern. Although the Eighth Circuit 
expressly adopted the ultimate employment decision standard, it often 
applied a broader standard. For example, in Manning v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., the court recognized that evidence of a “tangible 
change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material 
employment disadvantage” could amount to the sort of ultimate 
employment decision proscribed by Title VII.167
As previously noted, in Mattern, part of Mattern’s retaliation 
evidence consisted of her testimony regarding Eastman’s, and its 
employees’, harassment toward her. In one instance, Mattern was 
assigned to rebuild a pump, and although the mechanic who worked on 
the pump with her testified that Mattern rebuilt it correctly, another 
coworker, whom Mattern had named in her EEOC charge, told Mattern’s 
supervisor that the pump was not rebuilt correctly.168 As a result, Mattern 
failed the reassembly assignment.169 In sustaining the jury’s verdict on 
Mattern’s retaliation claim, and commenting on that particular incident, 
the district court noted that “[t]ampering with another employee’s work 
by another employee could reasonably be construed as sabotage 
condoned or directed by an employer for the purpose of establishing 
cause for discharge, demotion, reprimand or refusal to promote. This 
sabotage could have reasonably taken place in response to . . . Mattern’s 
actions regarding her complaints of sexual harassment.”170
In addition, Mattern testified that on another occasion her supervisor 
asked her to realign a pump while he watched.171 The pump was resting 
on a wooden pallet, which made it more difficult to realign.172 
only that the plaintiff establish “adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is 
reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.” Ray, 217 
F.3d at 1242–43 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998)). The Ninth 
Circuit could easily interpret Mattern’s experiences following her EEOC charge—the visit from her 
supervisors, the reprimand for being away from her work station to report the harassment she was 
experiencing, being placed on final warning, missing a pay increase, etc.—as adverse treatment that 
stemmed from a retaliatory motive and was reasonably likely to derail her or others from engaging in 
protected activity. 
 167. 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). See also Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 
(8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing employment consequences including the reduction of duties, lower 
performance evaluations, required special remedial training, and papering of the employee’s file 
with negative reports as serious enough to satisfy the ultimate employment decision standard, even 
though the employee was not discharged, demoted, or suspended). 
 168. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 713–14 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting District Court’s September 12, 1995, Order 
at 2–3). 
 171. Id. at 706. 
 172. Id. 
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Consequently, Mattern failed the assignment.173 She testified that she felt 
the pump had been deliberately placed on the wooden pallet to derail 
her.174 If heard by the Eighth Circuit, this testimony could have presented 
evidence of the type of tangible change in working conditions that 
constitutes a material employment disadvantage and is therefore intended 
to be actionable under Title VII. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recognized that 
Mattern’s negative reports, including her missed pay increase, resulted 
directly from her “apparent inability” to rebuild and realign pumps.”175 
Given that the negative reports jeopardized Mattern’s placement in 
Eastman’s apprenticeship program,176 they certainly disadvantaged her. 
The missed pay increase alone likely constituted the type of material 
employment disadvantage that, according to the Eighth Circuit, Title VII 
was intended to proscribe. Therefore, had the Eighth Circuit decided 
Mattern, the case likely would have had a different result. 
 
3.  Burlington’s response 
 
In sum, prior to Burlington, a case brought in one circuit could easily 
have a different result in another. Mattern is simply one example. This 
was the inevitable consequence of the absence of a uniform standard of 
retaliation. By creating a uniform standard, Burlington largely eliminated 
the potential for disparity between the results in one circuit compared to 
the results in another. It is therefore helpful in that sense. Since 
Burlington, retaliation plaintiffs no longer have to demonstrate that a 
challenged retaliatory action constituted an ultimate employment 
decision. They do not even have to show that the action was in any way 
connected to their employment. Burlington made that crystal clear: “[t]he 
scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related 
or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”177 Thus, Burlington 
fixed the first flaw in the Fifth Circuit’s standard. An employer can no 
longer effectively retaliate against an employee by taking retaliatory 
actions that deprive the employee of opportunities or adversely affect 
their status, just because those actions do not result in an ultimate 
employment decision. Burlington fixed the Fifth Circuit standard’s 
second flaw in the same breath. Neither the Fifth Circuit, nor any other 
court, can refuse to recognize a hostile work environment harassment 
claim as a separate basis for retaliation based on the fact that hostile 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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 176. Id. at 708. 
 177. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). 
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work environment harassment is not an ultimate employment decision. 
These results are consistent with Title VII’s design—to encourage the 
creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance measures, and 
with Title VII’s purpose—to prevent employers from engaging in 
retaliatory measures that dissuade employees from engaging in protected 
conduct.178
In addition, Burlington specified the type of employer actions that 
are covered by Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. Now, plaintiffs have 
an identified threshold level of substantiality that they must meet: they 
“must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse,” which means that the challenged action “well 
might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.’”179 This point also fixed the Fifth Circuit 
standard’s second flaw. Hostile work environment harassment is likely 
action that well might dissuade a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, and every 
other court, will probably have to recognize hostile work environment 
harassment as a separate basis for retaliation. Accordingly, an employer 
will no longer be able, theoretically, to retaliate against an employee who 
files a hostile work environment harassment claim (or any other 
discrimination claim) by creating a hostile work environment. Again, 
these results are consistent with the design and purpose of Title VII. 
In sum, Burlington is helpful because it created a uniform standard 
of retaliation that specifically addressed the flaws in the ultimate 
employment decision standard, applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, 
in a manner consistent with the design and purpose of Title VII. 
However, Burlington’s helpfulness has limits. Even though the answers 
it provided are significant, they are somewhat undermined by the 
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 179. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. 
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B.  Questions 
 
Unfortunately, the answers Burlington provided compel various 
questions. But since Burlington implied answers to some of the more 
troubling questions, they may not be as problematic as they seem. 
 
1.  What is the legal basis for the “well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker” standard? 
 
First, the majority did not explain how its interpretation of Title 
VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions compelled the 
standard it adopted. The majority examined the language of the 
antiretaliation provision and the language of the antidiscrimination 
provision and found that, as opposed to the antidiscrimination provision, 
the antiretaliation provision contains no words limiting its scope to 
workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory actions.180 Based on 
the language itself and on the different purposes behind the two 
provisions, the majority concluded that Congress intended the 
difference.181 Therefore, it held that the antiretaliation provision is not 
limited to employment-related or workplace-related retaliatory acts and 
harm.182
The majority also held, however, that the antiretaliation provision 
proscribes those retaliatory actions that “well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”183 The majority did not state that the antiretaliation 
provision proscribes only those retaliatory actions that well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination, but the conclusion follows from the fact that “a plaintiff 
must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse,” which means that the challenged action “well 
might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination.’”184 Thus, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a 
retaliation claim unless they can demonstrate that the retaliatory action 
would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
charge of discrimination. Accordingly, under the majority’s standard, 
Title VII proscribes “only those retaliatory acts that ‘well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
 180. Id. at 2411–12; see also supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 181. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12; see also supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text. 
 182. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. 
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discrimination.’”185 In contrast to its conclusion that the retaliatory action 
does not have to be employment related, the majority reached this 
conclusion without explicitly providing a basis for it. 
As Justice Alito suggested in his concurrence, “[t]he language of [the 
antiretaliation provision], which employs the unadorned term 
‘discriminate,’ does not support [the majority’s] test. The unstated 
premise of the majority’s reasoning seems to [have] be[en] that [the 
antiretaliation provision’s] only purpose is to prevent employers from 
taking those actions that are likely to stop employees from complaining 
about discrimination, but this unstated premise is unfounded.”186 Alito 
continued: 
 
While surely one of the purposes of [the antiretaliation provision] is to 
prevent employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade 
employees from engaging in protected conduct, there is no reason to 
suppose that this is [the antiretaliation provision’s] only purpose. 
Indeed, the majority itself identifies another purpose of the 
antiretaliation  provision: ‘to prevent harm to individuals’ who assert 
their rights.187
 
2.  Why is the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” 
standard so limited? 
 
Thus, a second question left unanswered is why the majority’s test 
proscribes only those employer actions that well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.188 Under the majority’s test, “employer conduct that 
causes harm to an employee is permitted” as long as the “conduct is not 
so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”189 In other words, consistent with 
Burlington, an employer can retaliate against an employee who makes or 
supports a charge of discrimination. The employer simply has to limit its 
retaliatory actions to actions that would not dissuade a reasonable 
employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. 
Although it is true that the Burlington majority did not explicitly 
address these first two questions, it implicitly did. One possible basis for 
its “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard is simply 
 185. Id. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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 188. See supra notes 185, 187 and accompanying text. 
 189. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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its consideration of the various standards used by the circuits and its 
conclusion that the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” 
standard was the best one. Indeed, in formally adopting the standard, the 
majority noted its agreement with the Seventh and District of Columbia 
Circuits, which, prior to Burlington, used the “well might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker” standard.190 Another possible basis for the standard 
is the majority’s effort to articulate a standard that effectively serves the 
purpose of Title VII. A primary purpose of Title VII is to prevent 
employers from engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade 
employees from engaging in protected conduct.191 Thus, the majority’s 
standard, which proscribes actions that well might dissuade a reasonable 
employee from asserting their rights, furthers that purpose. Alito 
suggested that the majority’s standard does not protect all employees 
who assert their rights because it proscribes only those employer actions 
that well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.192 However, Alito’s argument is 
flawed. It is true that the standard permits retaliatory conduct that is not 
so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination, but such retaliatory conduct is not 
contemplated by Title VII. As the majority emphasized before 
articulating the standard, Title VII protects an individual not from all 
retaliation, but from retaliation that results in an injury or harm.193 Thus, 
if the standard does not protect employees who assert their rights, it is 
because the employees are mistaken in assuming that their “rights” have 
been violated. 
The majority implied as much. After it introduced the standard by 
noting that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision does not protect 
employees from all retaliation,194 the majority then explained its use of 
the term “material” in the standard to separate significant harms, which 
are proscribed by Title VII, from trivial harms, which are not. Thus, the 
majority implied that its standard proscribes only those employer actions 
that are severe enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from asserting 
their rights because those are the only types of actions that Title VII 
proscribes. In sum, although the majority did not explicitly assert a legal 
basis for its adoption of the “well might have dissuaded a reasonable 
worker” standard, it did offer support for it, at least by implication. 
 
 190. Id. at 2415. 
 191. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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3.  What subjective factors does the objective “well might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker” standard contemplate, and how much weight 
should they be given? 
 
Unfortunately, even given the possible rationale for the majority’s 
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard, the standard 
itself is vague. Thus, a third question asks about the subjective 
component of the theoretically objective standard. The majority initially 
stated that the standard focuses on the reactions of a “reasonable 
employee” in determining whether a retaliatory action violates Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provision, and explained that the standard references 
the reactions of a reasonable employee because the majority believed that 
the antiretaliation provision’s standard for judging harm “must be 
objective.”195 The majority then explained that an objective standard 
“avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a 
judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”196 
However, the majority then suggested that at least some of a plaintiff’s 
subjective feelings are to be considered. The majority emphasized that 
“context matters,” and by way of example, explained that “[a] schedule 
change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to 
many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with 
school age children.”197
As Alito argued in his concurrence, this example suggests that the 
majority’s “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard does 
not ask whether a retaliatory action well might have dissuaded the 
average reasonable (i.e., objective) employee, laying aside all individual 
characteristics, but instead, asks whether the retaliatory action well might 
have dissuaded a reasonable employee who shares at least some of the 
retaliation victim’s individual characteristics.198 This example alone 
introduces three individual characteristics—age, gender, and family 
responsibilities—that may be appropriate characteristics for courts and 
juries to consider when applying the “well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker” standard.199 The majority suggested as much. 
However, the majority said nothing with respect to how many other 
characteristics may or must be considered, or what those characteristics 
are.200 Nor did the majority provide any guidance for weighing any 
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individual characteristics, including the characteristics it implicitly 
recognized in its example. It said nothing of how strong the subjective 
component of its objective test is. Given this lack of clarity, courts will 
have to address the issue case by case. 
However, courts have at least one example to reference in deciding 
the issue. Since the majority recognized that a schedule change may 
matter enormously to a young mother with school age children, it 
implicitly recognized that consideration should be given to an 
employee’s age, gender, and family responsibilities. Moreover, it implied 
that the weight to be given those subjective factors, at least when 
considered together, is substantial. That is, the three subjective factors 
distinguishing the young mother from other employees, added together, 
were enough for the court to suggest that a schedule change for her could 
dissuade her from asserting her rights. That determination, in turn, would 
satisfy the new standard. Thus, although the majority did not enumerate 
the subjective factors that may or must be considered in applying the 
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” standard, or state how 
the factors should be weighed, it did provide at least some guidance. 
 
 
4.  What does “well” mean? 
 
The admittedly vague “well might have dissuaded a reasonable 
worker” standard poses at least one more question: what does “well” 
mean? As Alito argued, the majority’s use of the terms “well might have 
dissuaded” introduces a “loose and unfamiliar causation standard . . . . in 
an area of law in which standards of causation are already complex.”201 
The standard says only that a plaintiff must show that the challenged 
action well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination. It does not say what “well” means. 
Thus, it is unclear how probable it must be that the challenged retaliatory 
action would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination for the action to constitute 
retaliation. 
Again, although the majority did not explicitly address this issue, it 
implicitly did. Since the majority’s standard is designed to distinguish 
between trivial and significant harms, it follows that the causation 
element is satisfied once a plaintiff establishes that the challenged harm 
is more than trivial. Perhaps the question is not as much a question of 
probability as it is a question of classification. If the asserted harm can be 
 201. Id. 
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classified as trivial, the causation element cannot be satisfied because the 
harm cannot be severe enough to sufficiently dissuade a reasonable 
worker from reporting it. On the other hand, if the harm can be classified 
as significant, it automatically satisfies the causation element because it 
is, by definition, severe enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from 
reporting it. Thus, by providing guidance for distinguishing between 
trivial and significant harms—by requiring that the challenged action be 
materially adverse—the majority simultaneously provided guidance for 
determining whether causation is satisfied. 
In sum, even though Burlington’s answers raise some questions, 
some answers to those questions can be drawn from the majority’s 
opinion. Thus, the questions may not be as problematic as they may 
seem. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Court’s decision in Burlington provided a resolution to the 
disagreement among the circuits regarding the proper standard of 
retaliation. Although its resolution is not free of complications, it is 
significant, and it is progress. 
Prior to Burlington, the success of a plaintiff’s retaliation case didn’t 
depend as much on its facts as on the circuit that heard it. Burlington 
largely fixed that because it created a uniform standard of retaliation. 
And, arguably, it created a better standard than those used by some of the 
circuits prior to Burlington. This is almost certainly true with respect to 
the standard applied in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. To be sure, 
Burlington fixed at least two flaws in their ultimate employment decision 
standard. 
First, prior to Burlington, plaintiffs in these circuits had to show that 
the challenged employer actions resulted in an ultimate employment 
decision. Accordingly, employers could effectively retaliate against 
employees by engaging in whatever adverse actions they wished, so long 
as none of them amounted to an ultimate employment decision. 
Burlington fixed that. Plaintiffs no longer have to show that the 
retaliatory actions resulted in an ultimate employment decision. 
Second, prior to Burlington, some circuits did not recognize hostile 
work environment as a separate basis for retaliation. As a result, 
employers could respond to an employee’s assertion of Title VII rights 
by creating a hostile work environment. Burlington fixed that as well. 
Now, as long as an employee can show that the creation of a hostile work 
environment well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination, they can use hostile 
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work environment harassment as a separate basis for retaliation, 
regardless of its success as a basis for discrimination. 
Both of these results are consistent with Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision’s purpose to prevent employers from taking retaliatory actions 
that dissuade employees from engaging in protected conduct. To the 
extent that they force employers to create antiharassment policies and 
effective grievance mechanisms, they are also consistent with Title VII’s 
design. In sum, although the answers Burlington provided may invite 
further questions, they did provide much needed clarity to retaliation law. 
They provided uniformity. They provided consistency. They 
provided . . . relief. 
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